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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS AND RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION - JENCKS AcT - The Jencks Act1 like the rule it
purportedly reaffirmed, was designed to insure "justice."2 Although the stated purpose of the act was to preserve the rights
of any defendant under due process of law, the question remains
unresolved whether, in articulating the rule in terms of "justice,"
the Court in Jencks v. United States3 incorporated it into the requirements of due process. To be sure, the underlying intent of
both the Court and Congress is unclear, but of far more concern
than the intent is whether the Jencks Act, in fact, violates the
constitutional mandates of the Fifth4 and Sixth5 Amendments,
even if the Jencks case itself was not based on constitutional
grounds.
The Court in Jencks clarified four procedural matters dealing with a defendant's right to inspect extra-judicial statements
made by government witnesses to government agents: (1) defendant is not required to establish a foundation of inconsistency
in order to inspect prior statements of witnesses; (2) whereas inspection of prior statements had formerly rested in the trial court's
discretion, the Jencks decision indicates that defendant is entitled
to inspect them as a matter of right; (3) the Court specifically
disapproved of the procedure whereby the requested documents
are submitted to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy
and materiality; (4) the Court ruled that a refusal by the government to comply with an order for production must result in
118 U.S.C. (1958) §3500. The full text of the statute is set out in the appendix infra.
2 See S. Rep. 981, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1862 (1957).
s 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Petitioner, a labor union official, had been convicted of making
false statements in a noncommunist affidavit filed pursuant to §9 (h} of the Taft-Hartley
Act. At the trial, two crucial government witnesses, both of whom were Communist Party
members, admitted making prior statements to the F. B. I. concerning activities of petitioner
about which they testified. Petitioner's counsel moved for production of these statements
for examination by the trial judge in camera, and delivery to the counsel of those portions found to be admissible for impeachment purposes. The motion was denied, and the
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that no foundation of inconsistency had been
laid. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the previous practice of requiring the defendant
to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the contents of the report and
the testimony before being entitled to inspect such reports to be in error. In addition,
the Court disapproved the accepted practice of an in camera examination by the trial
judge to determine relevancy and materiality. The dissent, on the other hand, declared
that unless Congress immediately changed the rule announced by the Court, agencies of
the federal government engaged in law enforcement might as well close up shop, for the
majority opinion has opened their files to the criminal.
4 U.S. CoNST., Amend. V.
5 U.S. CoNST., Amend. VI.
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a dismissal. As to (I) and (2), the act embodies the Court's
holding. With respect to (3) and (4), the act appears to limit
the holding; this will be discussed later in this comment.
It is indisputable that the Jencks case did, both in fact and in
effect, make sweeping changes in the development of rules applicable to a defendant's right of access to government documents
for the cross-examination and impeachment of government witnesses. 6 Congress, prompted by misinterpretation and the intrusion of the Jencks decision into often totally unrelated areas,
drafted legislation to clarify and delimit the reach of ]encks.1
However, it appears that in attempting to reaffirm the Jencks
rule, Congress passed an act which is not only defective and ambiguous in some respects, but which is also unduly restrictive,
for it forecloses access to impeachment materials in situations
seemingly not contemplated by Congress. The act seeks to establish a rule governing the production of statements and reports
of witnesses made to government agents which protects confidential information in the possession of the government and at the
same time provides the means for a defendant's presentation of
an adequate defense during criminal prosecutions.
In reading the act and the interpretation of it by the Court
in Palermo v. United States,8 it is questionable whether Congress
was aware of the fact that, in attempting to remedy the "Roman
Holiday" referred to in Justice Clark's dissent in ]encks,9 it was
creating in the act itself several means of evading its requirements
while at the same time preserving the government's advantage
6 Prior to Jencks case, the reasoning, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), had been that a foundation of inconsistency was
necessarily required before the defendant could have access to statements of witnesses. See
also Herzog v. United States, (9th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 352 U.S. 844
(1956); Scanlon v. United States, (1st Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 382. Furthermore, the accepted
practice required production of the requested statements to the trial judge for his inspection in camera, with the judge being obligated to turn over to the defendant such portions of the statements as were admissible in evidence for impeachment purposes. See
United States v. Krulewitch, (2d Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 76; United States C. Cohen, (2d
Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 323 U.S. 799 (1945); United States v. Beekman, (2d Cir.
1946) 155 F. (2d) 580; United States v. Grayson, (2d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 863; United
States v. Mesarosh, (W. D. Pa. 1953) ll6 F. Supp. 345, affd. (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449,
revd. on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). However, there was a decided lack of harmony
among the circuits as to the foundation upon which the right to such evidence was based
as well as to the application of the right itself. See comment, 106 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. IIO
(1957); note, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 314 (1957).
7 For a discussion, see the brief of Senator O'Mahoney, 103 CoNG. REc. 15938-15941
(1957). See also Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CATH. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 91 (1958); comment,
67 YALE L.J. 674 at 680-682 (1958).
8 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
9 353 U.S. 657 at 681-682 (1957).
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in using informer reports. For example, in Palermo, the defendant, being prosecuted for criminal tax evasion, requested production by the government of a conference memorandum made by
a government agent. The memorandum, consisting of a 600word summary of a conference which had lasted three and onehalf hours, was made up after the conference and represented the
agent's selection of those items of information deemed appropriate. The trial judge denied production of the memorandum on
the ground that it was not within the definition of the term
"statement" in paragraph (e) of the Jencks Act. The defendant
was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 10 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, with four
justices concurring in the result only.11 Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion of the Court, held that the act was the exclusive
means of compelling production of statements made by government witnesses to agents of the government, and that the court
below was justified in determining that the memorandum was
not within the act's definition of "statement."
No doubt the legislation was intended to limit types of statements and reports a defendant is entitled to examine in a criminal
suit. But in seeking to implement the principles of the Jencks
case, has Congress passed legislation invalid in itself? To a great
extent the answer to this lies in a determination of the true basis of
the Jencks case.12 To formulate answers to whether the act was
intended to be exclusive, and, if so, whether it violates the Fifth
Amendment due process clause or the Sixth Amendment compulsory process and right of confrontation clauses, a consideration
of the Jencks Act in light of the decision it purported to clarify is
necessary.

I. WAS THE JENCKS AcT INTENDED To BE ExcLusrVE?
The original bills drafted by the Justice Department contained language broad enough to have completely vitiated almost
every right a defendant might have had to obtain statements and
10 United
11 Justice

States v. Palermo, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 397.
Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas,
concurred in the result only because they felt that the memorandum did not come within
the term "statement" as defined by paragraph (e) of the Jencks Act. However, they felt
that the majority decided much more than the situation called for when it extended its
opinion to the question of the act's exclusivity. See 360 U.S. 343 at 360 (1959).
12 For articles which take the position that the Jencks case was based on constitutional
grounds, see Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CATII. UNIV. REv. 91 (1958); comment, 31 So.
CAL. L. REv. 78 (1957). For articles which take the position that the Jencks case merely sets
out a rule of criminal procedure, see comment, 106 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 110 (1957).
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reports of government witnesses in the possession of the government. The bills declared:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States, any rule of court or procedure to the contrary notwithstanding, no statement or report of any . . . person other
than the defendant which is in the possession of the United
States shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. "13
Paragraph (b) allowed inspection of statements and reports of
government witnesses relating to the subject matter to which the
witness had testified. Certainly this broad language would seem
to embrace the procedures defined by the federal rules prior to
the Jencks case as well as the limitations of the Jencks case itself.
Moreover, when the apparently absolute limitations of paragraph
(a) were combined with the restrictive definition of "statement"
in paragraph (e) of the proposed bills and the final enactment,
there appeared to be very little left of the original policies and
purposes of the Jencks case. However, the final enactment was
not so worded, for the language of the original bills was considerably modified to resemble more closely the Court's decision
in the Jencks case. Certainly it would seem that the deletion of
this broad language of exclusivity in conference compels an inference negating absolute exclusivity in the act as passed.14 Clearly
Congress has not defined all of the possible situations which fall
outside of the act in which statements would be invaluable to the
defendant for purposes of cross-examination: for example, where
the government agent makes use of the reports, but the prosecution does not call the witness; where a written statement is given
by the witness yet not signed or otherwise adopted by him; where
an oral report is summarized substantially verbatim though not
contemporaneously with the recital of the witness; and where the
statements would be consistent with the testimony of the witness
or would not relate to his testimony yet would indicate strong
bias on the part of the witness.15 In these instances, the undesirability of denying the accused access to such statements on the
grounds of the exclusivity of the act becomes particularly pronounced if the testimony of the witness is the turning point of
13 Emphasis added. For the complete text of the bills, see S. Rep. 569, 85th Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 10-11 (1957), and H. Rep. 700, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 (1957).
14 See the concurring opinion of Justice Clark in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343 at 363 (1959).
15 See comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 at 693 (1958).
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the prosecution's case and the basis of guilt or innocence in the
mind of the jury.
The Court in Palermo, although admitting that "exclusiveness" is nowhere expressed in the act, maintains the somewhat
dubious theory that, "Some things [exclusivity] too clearly evince
a legislative enactment to call for a redundancy of utterance."16
To be sure, the act does not provide for the inspection of unauthenticated statements or reports or oral statements transcribed
by a government agent in summary fashion, for the procedure of
paragraphs (b) and (c) is limited to forms of authenticating
statements as defined in paragraph (e). However, paragraph (a)
is not so limited.17 Furthermore, the conspicuous absence of
the phrase "any rule of court or procedure to the contrary notwithstanding" in the final enactment, even though a precise standard of authenticity is required by paragraph (e), should not suggest a similarity of exclusive prohibitory purposes.18 Keeping in
mind the legislative intent to clarify and reaffirm the Jencks case,
this reasoning appears even more valid, for certainly the Court in
Jencks did not limit its ruling to any precise definitions or forms
of authenticity.
But even if it is assumed that the act was intended to be exclusive, to what was this exclusivity intended to apply? If the act is
merely a procedural device for obtaining the types of documents
within its definition, it does not necessarily follow that the rationale
of the Jencks case cannot be utilized to obtain those documents that
fall without the purview of the act.19 It is entirely conceivable that
360 U.S. 343 at 350 (1959).
the word "report" is not mentioned after paragraph (a). Unlike
the word "statement," the word "report" is not defined. It seems to have been entirely forgotten to the point of its not having even been argued in any cases to which paragraph (e)
has been applied. Apparently the thought must be that the two words are used interchangeably despite the use of the disjunctive "or" in paragraph (a). But it certainly seems
that the possible distinction ought to be argued.
18 Congressman Celler stated: "The proposed legislation is not designed to touch in
any way the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process :is concerned. It seeks
only to set up a procedural device for the setting up of standards of interpretation for
safeguarding the needless disclosure of confidential information in Government files and,
at the same time, assuring defendants access to the material in those files pertinent to the
testimony of the Government witness.•.. [W]e are simply attempting to provide a procedural process. In doing so, this procedure concerns itself with and limits itself to those
kinds of statements, documents, and so forth." 103 CONG. R.Ec. 16738 (1957).
"It is the specific intent of the bill to provide for the production only of written
statements previously made by a Government witness in the possession of the United States
which are signed by him or otherwise adopted or approved by him, and any transcription
or recordings of oral statements made by the witness to a Federal law officer, relating to the
matter as to which the witness has testified." S. Rep. 981, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1957).
This does not suggest that exclusiveness should extend beyond the limitations of the act.
19 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 at 86 (1957).
;J.6

17 Interestingly,
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the act is merely the exclusive method for obtaining "statements"
within its definition. Certainly the act does not purport to supplant discovery under rules 16 and 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.20 In fact, reference to these rules was expressly made in the early drafts of the bill,21 but was omitted from
the act as adopted in order to preclude any thoughts that the act
was intended to modify or reduce their use.22 Thus, since Congress
intended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to remain applicable in situations covered by the rules and not by the Jencks
Act, there seems to be no reason militating against concluding
similarly that because the rule set forth in the Jencks case is broader than that prescribed by the act, the Jencks case should control in
those situations not provided for in the act.

II.

THE JENCKS AcT AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

Assuming arguendo that the Jencks Act is exclusive not only
as to statements and reports that fall within its definition but as
to that information outside of its specific words as well, it is questionable whether the act satisfies the dictates of the Sixth Amendment.
As necessary and desirable as constitutional flexibility is, the
inevitable effect is the element of uncertainty. But whatever the
reaches of uncertainty are, the right to cross-examine, whether defined as a rule of evidence or stated in principles of constitutional
law, has been firmly embedded in our judicial system. Of course,
20 "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible
objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or
by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of
his defense and that the request is reasonable.••." Rule 16, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc.,
18 U.S.C. App. (1958).
"A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. . • . The court may
direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced
before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be
offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents
or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys." Id., Rule
17 (c).
For a very thorough discussion of the operation of rule 16 and rule 17 (c), see Orfield,
"Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure," 59 VA. L. R.Ev. 221, 312 (1957).
The Supreme Court has read into rule 17 (c) the requirement that the materials designated
in the subpoena be evidentiary, i.e., "admissible in evidence." Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 214 at 221 (1951) (dictum); note, 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 492 (1954).
21 See 103 CoNG. REc. 16130 (1957).
22 See discussion in Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CAra. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 91 (1958);
comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
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there are many instances when practical necessity justifies modification of the right of cross-examination, but even these departures
are permitted only to the extent they promote fairness to the accused rather than prejudice his rights.23
Dean Wigmore has defined the right of confrontation as the
indispensable opportunity to cross-examine, and in stating its
essentiality in the most positive and absolute of terms has said,
". . . [I] t is beyond any doubt the greatest _legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth. . . . If we omit
political considerations of broader range, then cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to improved
methods of trial-procedure.24
"In short, however radically the jury-trial rules of Evidence may be dispensed with, [the right of cross-examination]
. . . remains as a fundamental of fair and intelligent investigation of disputed facts." 25
The need for the constitutional inquiry is raised forcefully by the
suggestion of these words that the right of cross-examination is part
of that "fundamental fairness" essential to a fair trial. If the effect
of the exclusive application of the Jencks Act is such that it hampers
the accused in his defense by denying him access to prior inconsistent statements related to the testimony of an actual witness in
order to cross-examine effectively, then the act may well be violative
of the Sixth Amendment.26 In the Palermo case, Justice Brennan,
in his concurring opinion, pointed out the fact that a statute which
restrains the trial judge from ordering the production of such
statements as might aid the defendant raises an obvious threat of
deprival of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.27
In the Jencks case, the Court ruled that to require the accused
to establish an inconsistency between the testimony of a witness
at the trial and his extrajudicial statements to government agents
before the accused is allowed access to the statements would be to
deny him evidence relevant to his defense.28 This latter phrase,
"evidence relevant to his defense," was used in prior decisions
23See 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1401 (1940) .
.24 Id., §1367.
25 Id., §1400.
26 See the discussion in United States v. Burr, (C.C.

Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 187 at 193.
Although the case dealt with the production of a letter used by a witness to refresh his
recollection, the policies announced by the court are applicable here.
27 See the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, 360 U.S. 345 at 363 (1959).
28 353 U.S. 657 at 667 (1957).

1960]

COMMENTS

895

when questions of Sixth Amendment violations were raised. 29 In
United States v. Schneiderman,30 the court in effect held that reports used to test the credibility of witnesses in reality become witnesses in the defendant's favor. In that case the government
claimed privilege under a Department of Justice order which
classified reports of witnesses as confidential, thereby precluding
their disclosure for any purpose whatsoever. Nevertheless, the
court compelled production and justified its decision on Sixth
Amendment grounds.31 The Court in Jencks, citing Schneiderman
in footnote 13 of its opinion,32 reasoned similarly when it said that
the Attorney General labors under a duty to see that "justice be
done." The Court's opinion, moreover, embodied the Schneiderman rationale that to that end the Attorney General may not withhold "evidence essential to the proper disposition of the case, including, a fortiori, any evidence which may be material to the
defense of the accused. " 33 In view of the fact that the withholding
by the Department of Justice has raised questions of Sixth Amendment violations, it would be fair to assume that a legislative procedural rule which precludes disclosure of an unsigned written
statement or of an oral statement recorded substantially verbatim,
though not contemporaneously with its recital, could not accomplish what the Attorney General or the Department of Justice
order could not accomplish constitutionally.34
29 E.g., United States v. Schneiderman, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731; United States
v. Coplon, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629. See also Eagleton, "A State Prosecutor Looks at
the Jencks Case," 4 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 405 (1957).
30 (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731. Defendants, indicted under the Smith Act for
conspiring to commit offenses against the United States, sought an order directing the
government to produce for inspection and use by the defense on cross-examination of
government witnesses certain reports made by those witnesses to the F.B.I. The government asserted a claim of privilege. The district court held that any privilege on the part
of the government to withhold the reports from inspection had been waived by the
government by questions asked by it on direct examination of the witnesses. While the
interpretation might be considered rather tenuous, it nevertheless seems that the court
equated reports and witnesses.
31 Id. at 736.
32 353 U.S. 657 at 668 (1957).
33 United States v. Schneiderman, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731 at 739. And see
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 at 668, n. 13, citing Canon 5, A.B.A., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1947) ["The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."
Thus, it would seem that if the government is aware of the inconsistency it is under a duty
to disclose to and provide the defendant with the material necessary to reveal the inconsistency.] See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 at 88 (1934).
34 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1957).
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In United States v. Coplon,3 5 the Second Circuit stated that
when the government chooses to prosecute an individual, the right
of that individual to meet the charges against him by introducing
relevant documents to his defense cannot be subject to the control and caprice of the government. The court reasoned that
whenever the government claim of privilege conflicts with the
right of the accused "to have compulsory process [and other evidence] in his favor," the Attorney General must decide whether
the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is
greater than the attendant public prejudice in disclosing confidential information in the possession of the government which
might be relevant to the defense. 36
In the Coplon case, the prosecution argued that the government
privilege precluded disclosure of informer statements and state
secrets. And it must be recognized that traditionally there is a government privilege in this area. However, it would seem that the
arguments for government privilege and the limitations on right of
access should apply with even less vigor than in Coplon to the situations under discussion here. Since the Jencks Act establishes a rule
concerning information already disclosed by government witnesses
during the course of the trial, a situation calling for the production
of state secrets rarely, if ever, will arise. Thus, when the basis for
secrecy is removed or when none exists initially, there should be no
reason operating against disclosure directly to the defendant.37
If the identity of the witness is known, if the government uses his
statements as a basis for prosecution, or if the informer testifies at
the trial concerning those same statements, the suppression of possible exculpatory statements seems illogical.38 On the other hand,
the extrajudicial statements may be highly relevant to the defense
and, consequently, the disposition to disclose these statements
35 (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629.
36 Id. at 638. See also United States

v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 187. Chief
Justice Marshall stated at 191-193: " . . . Let it be supposed that the letter may not contain
anything respecting the person now before the court. Still it may respect a witness material
in the case, and become important by bearing on his testimony. Different representations
may have been made by that witness, or his conduct may have been such as to affect his
testimony. In various modes a paper may bear upon the case, although before the case be
opened its particular application cannot be perceived by the judge." Commenting on the
Burr case, in the Jencks decision, Justice Brennan remarked at 353 U.S. 669, n. 14 (1957):
"\\7hat is true before the case is opened is equally true as it unfolds. The trial judge cannot perceive or determine the relevancy and materiality of the documents to the defense
without hearing defense argument, after inspection, as to its bearing upon the case."
37 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2374, p. 755 (1940). See also comment, 11 STAN. L.
REv. 297 at 306 (1959). For an excellent discussion of the use of informer testimony, see,
generally, comment, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
38 Ibid.
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ought to be heightened notwithstanding their failure to conform
to paragraph (e)'s definition of "statement." Moreover, to allow
technical rules of rather dubious merit to prohibit impeachment
through cross-examination may, in the absence of other means of
attacking their credibility, allow convictions to be based on the
untested and unsupported recollections of informers, a class of witnesses whose very livelihood, in many cases, depends on the acceptance of their testimony. As a very minimal requirement, the credibility of such witnesses ought to be subjected to the severest
scrutiny.89
In Riser v. Teets,4° although the error was held not to be prejudicial since the remainder of the evidence was overwhelming,
the court nevertheless stated that it was error to refuse to furnish
copies of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses to the defendant. However, the dissent deemed the error prejudicial in that
there could be no compromise with a constitutional right, and
stated, ". . . a right of an accused to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor is also a right implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. . . . [It] extends to documentary as
well as oral evidence. . . . [T]he vacating of the subpoena for the
production of the statements of these witnesses was a plain denial
of this due process. " 41
Congress, in addition to the courts in these three cases, recognized the use of either the compulsory process or right of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to justify providing the
defendant with the statements of witnesses and other evidence relevant to his defense. The legislative history of the Jencks Act reveals
the serious doubts of some of the legislators as to the constitutionality of exclusionary provisions which turn on form rather than
substance. Senator J avits remarked that the constitutional mandates cannot be avoided so easily by a witness simply not signing a
statement: if a report of a witness is sufficient to impeach that
witness, the defendant is entitled to use it whether written or
not. 42 And certainly it would seem that the senator's reasoning
embodies a logical appreciation of the problems raised by the act.
89 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. R.Ev.
40 (9th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 844.
41 Id. at 847 (dissent).

78 at 82 (1957).

42103 CONG. R.Ec. 15933-15934 (1957). Senator Javits also stated: "Certainly we cannot repeal or change the due process clause; nor do we wish to do so. Within the limits of
the Constitution we are trying to protect the F.B.I. files.••• The bill is designed to protect, and does protect, the F.B.I. files to the full extent they ought to be protected, con•
sistent with the right of the individual to due process••••"
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If the unsigned statement used to impeach the witness is not that
of the witness, then it can be so explained. And if the unsigned
statement is that of the witness, and the witness denies making it,
then it would seem that its direct relevance to the issues of the
case would permit the defendant to have the government agent
verify its authenticity. But to prohibit altogether access to material
of impeachment value would be to deny the constitutional right
to cross-examine effectively. With respect to impeachment, the
defendant would be in no better position, as a practical matter, than
if the witness remained anonymous, or the entire proceeding was
ex parte with the government submitting its arguments while the
accused submitted none.43 The denial of the available material
and effective sources from which to cross-examine, seemingly possible under the Jencks Act, is practically tantamount to the denial
of cross-examination itself.

III.

THE JENCKS AcT AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Continuing, as in the above discussion, the assumption of the
exclusiveness of the act, it is relevant also to question the act from
the standpoint of the fair trial requirements of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. To appraise the act properly in this
respect, it is first necessary to place it more specifically in a context
of the Jencks case. The majority opinion in Jencks skillfully
avoided any reference to the Constitution. But the conspicuous
absence of the phrase "due process of law" in the opinion might
well have been due to the exercise of judicial self-restraint, since
the holding was necessarily based on other grounds. 44 Even though
the Court was in many respects without precedent, the opinion
seems sufficiently broad to indicate that constitutional mandates
at least provided a guide. 45 Moreover, the conclusion is inescapable that the Court by-passed the narrow grounds of the appeal
in order to deal with the more significant issue of the demands of
43

31

See, generally, Mulvaney, "Government Secrecy and the Right of Confrontation,"

NOTRE DAME LAWYER 602 (1956).
44 The opinion is outwardy based

upon error of the lower court in denying the motion
for inspection. Considering the government's sole ground of objection, that a preliminary
foundation of inconsistency was not laid between the contents of the reports and the testimony of the witness, and upon which ground the court of appeals affirmed, the Supreme
Court holds this as error, since for production purposes it need appear only that the evidence is relevant, competent and outside the exclusionary rule. The Court held only that
the trial court and the appellate court erred. No expression was made that this was error
because the defendant, under the Fifth Amendment, had a right of inspection.
45 See concurring opinion of Justice Clark in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 at
363 (1959).
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justice in affording access to government files. 46 What, then,
compels the belief that due process of law was the basis of the
Court's reasoning in Jencks?
First, and perhaps the strongest indication, is the language
of Justice Brennan that, "Justice requires no less." 47 This language, coupled with the Court's approbation of language in United
States v. Reynolds,4 8 strongly suggests due process. Certainly the
limits of "justice," although insusceptible of precise definition,
must be moored to some basic structure. Justice in the abstract
is almost meaningless unless attached to the basic rights which
dictate it. And, it is indeed arguable that this basic right is that
of due process of law afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
Second, it appears that the defendant in the Jencks case could
not have invoked either rule 16 or 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for he sought the production of documents
within the purview of neither. Rule 16 pertains to documents
seized or otherwise obtained from the defendant by the government, while rule 17 (c) relates to an expeditious method of requiring production of documents before trial to be used during the
trial. If, then, there is a right to obtain these documents, it is not
unreasonable to assume that it arises as an integral part of the
broader constitutional right to a fair trial. Although its outer
limits are indefinite, the concept of a fair trial may be defined
in terms of its recognized elements.49 It would seem that one of
these elements is the right to cross-examine effectively, for "it is
unconscionable to allow . . . [the government] to undertake
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense." 50
46 See Eagleton, "A State Prosecutor Looks at the Jencks Case," 4 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J.
405 (1957).
47 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957).
48 345 U.S. I at 12 (1952). Chief Justice Vinson stated, "The rationale of the criminal
cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see
that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense."
49 See, generally, Inbau, "The Concept of Fair Hearing in Anglo-American Law," 31
TULANE L. R.Ev. 67 (1956).
50 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I at 12 (1953) (dictum). See also Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 at 60 (1957), where the Court said in response to the government's seeking to prevent disclosure of informer reports: "A further limitation on the
applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where
the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way." And in United States v. Beekman, (2d Cir. 1946)
155 F. (2d) 580 at 584, Judge Frank said: "We have recently held that when the Government institutes criminal proceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a statute
or regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons the privilege."
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Third, to erect procedural barriers to obstruct the defendant's
access to materials which might lead to his exculpation would be
inconsistent with the basic philosophy of giving all possible protection to the innocent. "As applied to a criminal trial, denial of
due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial
of it [the court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally
infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such a quality
as necessarily prevent a fair trial."51 It would seem that "fundamental fairness" would require making readily available material
needed to impeach a witness and perhaps to exculpate a defendant.
Moreover, a procedural form of suppression would be "fatally infectious" to the point of preventing a "fair trial." Although a
witness' testimony need not necessarily be perjured, or known to
be so, a procedural suppression of invaluable impeachment information would seem similar to the intentional suppression of
evidence which would refute testimony known to be perjured, a
practice which has been held to be a violation of due process.5!
In both instances, it would seem that neither the perjury or its
possibility, nor the knowledge of the prosecution, is the greater
wrong. Rather, the greater and more infectious wrong is the suppression, and therefore the same reasoning should be opposed to
procedural suppression.
Assuming that the requirements of due process are the basis
for the Jencks decision, an examination of the act reveals a definite
delimitation of, if not an actual derogation from, the decision.
Three specific examples point out the extent of the encroachment
by the act into the principles enunciated by the Jencks case.
First, although the Court was without judicial precedent,53
the in camera inspection provided for in paragraph (c) of the act
is precisely the practice disapproved of in Jencks, for the Court
reasoned that only the defendant was adequately equipped to
determine the need for and the effective use of prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment purposes, and thus production must
be directly to the defendant.54 Under the act, however, since the
51 Lisenba
52 Mooney

v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 236 (1941).
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Factually the Mooney case can be distinguished from the Jencks case since in Jencks no perjury was known to exist, and there
was no intentional suppression of evidence by the prosecution. However, the fact that
perjury is not known to exist does not mean that it does not exist in fact. Further, there
need be no intentional suppression by the prosecution if the procedural rules accomplish
the same thing.
53 See note 6 supra.
54 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957). See comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297 at 301-308 (1959).
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accused or his attorney will not be present when the inspection is
made and will not know the contents of the reports, it will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a meaningful objection to the determination of the trial judge. A fortiori an appellate
review will have the same defect, because the ability of the accused
to make an effective argument is necessarily dependent on his
knowledge of the contents of the reports. While it is true that the
Jencks rule evolved from a balancing of the government's interests
in secrecy against the interests of the defendant in material relevant
to his defense,55 the essentiality of the evidence raises a question of
degree only, while reason should dictate that production should be
to the defendant in the first instance.
Second, the Court in Jencks made no distinction as to the form
of statements given by the witness to the government agent. Yet
paragraph (e) of the act reveals a studious attempt to crystallize
all possibilities into a rather inflexible definition. In practice, it
is not only conceivable but it is probably to be expected that more
and more interviewers will take advantage of the loopholes in the
act by putting the interview into the words of the interviewer, as
was done in Palermo. As a result, the ability to impeach the witness will be defeated by a requirement based on technicalities of
form rather than on substance. Clearly this is contrary to the intent of the Court in the Jencks case, because the Court made no
such distinctions and drew no such fine lines. Rather the Court
dealt merely with the production of relevant information.56 To
reason, as did the appellate court in Palermo, that the memorandum was not intended to be substantially verbatim of anything
recited by the witness57 is to reason erroneously, for the intent of
the recorder has little, if any, bearing on the issue of the substance
of the report. The essential requirement for production ought
not to be the form in which the witness's words are recorded or the
intent of the recorder, but rather that the report contains the prior
extrajudicial inconsistent statements sought by the defendant.58
If the memorandum contains only one substantially-verbatim sentence out of hundreds, this does not mean that the value of that
one sentence for impeachment would be lessened. In the Palermo
case, the 600-word memorandum might have been a substantiallyverbatim summary of all the statements needed for impeachment
See note, 18 LA. L. R.Ev. 345 (1958).
U.S. 657 at 672 (1957).
57 United States v. Palermo, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 397 at 399.
58 See comment, 34 IND. L.J. 441 at 442, n. 11 (1959).
55

56 353
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purposes and, further, it might have been a substantial recordation of all the material related to that matter testified to at the
trial. However, since the 600 words were not a substantially-verbatim transcription of the entire interview, they would not come
within the definition in paragraph (e) of the act. Yet no one could
dispute the fact that their quality for impeachment purposes would
be no greater if the whole interview had been recorded.
Thus, it would seem that if the Jencks case sets forth a rule of
procedural due process, the Jencks Act has truly departed from the
spirit of that decision59 and would therefore be repugnant to the
Fifth Amendment. Even if the Court in the Jencks case based
its decision solely on its common-law power to administer procedural and evidentiary rules for the federal courts, 60 rather than on
constitutional grounds, it is certainly arguable that through legislation, Congress, by according the defendant so much less than
did the Court in Jencks, lessened his rights to such an extent that
the act itself is a violation of due process. Since the requirements
of due process of law serve as a restraint on congressional as well
as judicial powers, Congress is not free to make whatever procedure
it wishes "due process of law." 61 In striving to dispense justice in
criminal proceedings, the means by which the justice is to be
achieved must be considered as vital and significant as the justice
itself. Procedural due process requires that the rules conform to a
sound conception of the protective devices of the Constitution, not
that the concept of due process be altered and molded to conform
59 Another departure may perhaps be found in the fact that the procedure provided
for in paragraph (d) of the act differs markedly from the procedure outlined in the Jencks
case. The Court there adopted, without modification, the portions of the Reynolds opinion
to the effect that in criminal cases the government can invoke its evidentiary privilege only
at the expense of letting the defendant go free. 353 U.S. 657 at 671 (1957). And see notes
48 and 50 supra. See also Schwartz, "Jencks-An Unveiling Pattern of Expanding Federal
Criminal Discovery," 3 So. TEX. L.J. 111 at 139 (1957).
60 See Scales v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 21, cert. granted 358 U.S. 917
(1958); United States v. Spangelet, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 338; United States v. Angelet,
(2d Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 383. See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 at 341
(1943), where the Court said: "In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts ••• this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions."
61 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272
at 276-277 (1855): "The constitution contains no description of those processes which it
was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and can. not be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by
its mere will."
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to the rules. 62 To be sure, the history of the act indicates a congressional awareness of this, for the legislators continually referred
to their duty to afford due process of law. 63 But awareness of a duty
and the discharge of that duty are two different things. Undoubtedly many of the inconsistencies between the act and the Jencks case
were generated by the desire to legislate in this area before the impending recess. 64 However, this explanation offers little solace to
an accused.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The general gravity and stigma of a criminal prosecution
should not be treated so lightly as to withdraw access to possible
exculpatory statements on so restrictive a definition as that found
in the act. If the theories of the prosecution in any given case are
correct, then certainly no prejudice will result from disclosure of
the statements, since only the statements related to matters testified to will be involved. And if the theories of the prosecution are
incorrect, then any prejudice to the government resulting from
disclosure would be justified. The cases in which the Jencks rule
was applied, 65 though not always satisfactorily or rationally, would
still seem indicative of a general tendency to attach greater significance to the basic rights propounded in the Jencks case than Congress appears to have recognized in its enactment.
The constitutional questions raised by the application of the
act are probably due more to the label of "exclusivity" attached
by the Court in the Palermo case than to any one other single factor. Although the judiciary's duty to bridge the gaps in statutes
in order to formulate purposes and policies is often unavoidable,
the task is a dangerous one, to be approached with extreme caution. 66 It is questionable whether the admonitory dictum of the
Court in Palermo resulted from the exercise of such caution. In
view of the basic rights the Court endorsed in the Jencks case, the
62Jbid.
63 See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 15915, 15916, 15932 (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney),
16489 (remarks of Senator Cooper) (1957).
64The principal discussion started in the Senate on Friday, August 23, 1957, 103 CoNG.
REc. 15781-15792 (1957); was resumed on Monday, August 26, 1957, id. at 15915-15942;
then shifted to the House on Tuesday, August 27, 1957, id. at 16084, 16113-16130. On
Thursday, August 29, 1957, the Senate passed the Conference bill, id. at 16486, and on
Friday, August 30, 1957, the House passed it, id. at 16734.
65 See cases discussed in the brief of Senator O'Mahoney, 103 CONG. REc. 15938-15941
(1957).
66 See, generally, Horack, "Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation,"
3 VAND. L. REv. 382 (1950). See also Frankfurter, "Foreword" to "A Symposium on
Statutory Construction," 3 VAND. L. REv. 365 (1950).
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conclusion would seem even more compelling that the Court's
interstitial exercise of a limited legislative function in Palermo was
unwarranted. If "exclusivity" is to remain the only construction,
then it appears that the need for an amendment to the act is an
essential one - perhaps more essential than the need for the passage
of the act in the first instance.
Robert ]. Margolin, S.Ed.

APPENDIX
THE JENCKS A<::r

[18 U.S. C. (1958) §3500]
" (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or re•
port in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Govern•
ment shall be subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified
on direct examination in the trial of the case.
"(b) After a witness called by the United States, has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any state•
ment (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of
any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court
shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the
inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement
to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and
the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of
such statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event the defendant
appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the
correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a
defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon application of said
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be
reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his
preparation for its use in the trial.
"(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under
paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the reoord the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the oourt in its discretion shall
determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
"(e) The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section
in relation to any witness called by the United States, means " (1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him; or
" (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of
such oral statement."

